This paper describes the Coalition Provisional Authority's attempts to stabilize and reform Iraq's economy along market lines. It argues that while security concerns remain serious, Iraq's economy has not been crippled by violence. However, sustained economic growth will depend on whether Iraq's future leaders pursue the pro-market approaches the Coalition has advocated. If the Iraqi economy is to reach its potential, it will need to go even farther than the Coalition did, implementing reforms the Coalition did not pursue because of security concerns.
The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not reflect official positions of the Coalition Provisional Authority, the U.S. Treasury, the Bank of England, the U.S. Federal Reserve System, or any other national or international agency. Officials of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank participated in many of the discussions discussed in this paper. Though the number of people who worked with us and thereby contributed to this paper is far too large for us to name them all, we would like to note the particularly useful contributions of two persons: Scott Brown, the IMF's resident representative in Iraq, who was injured in the bombing of the Canal Hotel on August 19, 2003;  and Jacob Nell, a senior adviser to Iraq's Ministry of Finance on leave from the British government, who was injured in the attack on the Al-Rasheed Hotel on October 26, 2003.
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whether Iraq's future leaders pursue the pro-market approaches that the Coalition has advocated. If the Iraqi economy is to reach its potential, it will need to go even farther than the Coalition did, implementing some reforms that the CPA did not pursue because of security concerns.
I. Iraq's Economy Before the War
Although Iraq's ruling Baath party was socialist, the country had a mixed economy before the war. Most people worked in the private sector, though a majority of these jobs were in the informal economy. Many were engaged in trading or subsistence agriculture or some other form of self-employment. Probably no more than a fifth of the labor force worked for regular pay in a formally registered firm. About a quarter to a third of the labor force worked for the government, mostly in a government ministry, the army, or in one of the 200 or so aging state-owned enterprises. The government did not set prices for private goods, but it controlled all oil revenues and the prices of refined oil products. It could force private firms to act in consort with the "national plan," and, after 1990, it directly distributed food rations to virtually everyone in the country.
Saddam Hussein created the food rationing system in response to a United Nations embargo imposed days after Iraq invaded Kuwait. The food basket was increased after 1996, when the UN's Oil-for-Food program allowed Iraq to sell oil in exchange for humanitarian imports. Iraqis were free to supplement their rations with purchases from the private market, but their ability to do so was limited by low incomes.
Those at the bottom of the public-sector pay scale, like teachers, made less than $10 per month before the 2003 war. Moving up the income distribution, a branch manager at a state-owned bank made about $40 per month, and the owner of a private-sector food store in Baghdad might clear $60 a month. The country's Minister of Oil had an annual base salary of $20,000 (Oliver and McPherson, 2003) .
GDP
Reliable figures for aggregate income before the war do not exist. Saddam
Hussein did not publish real GDP figures, and those that were calculated (and kept hidden) were distorted by valuing international transactions at the official exchange rate of 0.311 Iraqi dinars per U.S. dollar. By the late 1990s, inflation had caused the market rate of the dinar to depreciate to around 2,000 to the dollar.
Figure 1 presents our rough estimates for real per-capita GDP, based in part on data from Iraq's Central Statistical Organization (CSO). 1 After 1991, the data do not include figures for the three northern Kurdish-dominated provinces, or "governorates."
The Kurdish region became essentially autonomous after the Persian Gulf War, protected by a no-fly zone established by the allies.
During the 1970s both the oil and the non-oil sectors grew rapidly. World oil prices were high, and Iraq's oil production rose from 1.5 million barrels per day (bpd) in 1970 to 3.5 million bpd in 1979. Soaring oil revenues allowed the government to conduct investment programs outside the oil sector, so the non-oil economy grew as well.
Iraq's economic meltdown began with the onset of its eight-year war with Iran in September 1980. Oil production virtually ceased the following month, and Iraq's Gulf port facilities were destroyed in November. Production averaged slightly more than 1 million bpd from 1981 to 1985, recovering to just below 3 million bpd the year after the war. The second major interruption to oil revenues came during the Persian Gulf War.
Allied attacks in January 1991 brought a complete halt to oil production; postwar exports were constrained by the ensuing UN embargo. Oil production was held near the level of domestic consumption (about 500,000 bpd) until 1996, at which point Iraq 1 Data from Iraq's CSO can be used to figure non-oil GDP, because the use of inaccurate exchange rates does not distort the non-oil figures from the domestic economy nearly as much as those for the oil sector. Nominal, non-oil GDP is first deflated into 2002 dinars using Iraq's consumer price index. Dividing the resulting constant-dinar series by the 2002 exchange rate (1955.25 dinars = 1 dollar) gives an estimate of real non-oil GDP in terms of 2002 U.S. dollars. Output in Iraq's oil sector is estimated from data from the U.S. Energy Information Agency (which closely track data from the Iraqi government during the period when the two sources overlap). 
Employment
Data from Iraq's 1997 census can be used to generate labor-force participation rates and employment shares by industry. The results, which pertain only to civilian employees outside the Kurdish region, are displayed in Table 1 . As of the census day (October 16, 1997) , about two-thirds of Iraqi men aged 10 or older were in the labor force, though only 7.5 percent of women were. This rate of female participation is low even among economies of the Middle East. Although oil accounts for most of Iraqʹs GDP, it is extremely capital intensive, accounting for less than one percent of aggregate employment. The largest employers for men are public administration, wholesale and retail trade, and agriculture. For women, major employers are education and agriculture. Although women are less likely to be in the labor force, those who work are likely to be more highly educated than men, often working as teachers or government technocrats. Table 1 also shows that about 18 percent of men and 2 percent of women were unemployed when the survey was taken.
Infrastructure and investment
Even before the looting and sabotage of 2003, Iraq's infrastructure was fragile because of a dearth of capital investment during the previous two decades. Figure 2 presents real gross capital formation in the private and government sectors from 1980 to 2001. The data are unadjusted figures from Iraq's CSO, but because they measure domestic investment in real terms, they are less affected than the GDP figures by the overvaluation of the official exchange rate. The figure shows that both public and private investment collapsed during the Iran-Iraq war, and was miniscule during the 1990s.
Iraq's infrastructure also bears the scars of the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War. Allied attacks hit the country's electricity grid and telecommunications network particularly hard. According to a recent joint UN/World Bank assessment (2003a), peak electricity demand before the Gulf War had been about 5,000-7,500 megawatts (MW), and generating capacity had been about 9,300 MW. Damage from allied attacks during the Gulf War reduced generating capacity to just 2,300 MW.
During the 1990s, efforts to rebuild the infrastructure were thwarted by the UN embargo, which denied the country a source of spare parts. Iraqi engineers still managed to repair much of the electricity grid by cannibalizing parts from some generating facilities to rebuild others. Parts imported through the UN Oil-for-Food program permitted generating capacity to climb to about 4,400 MW by 2002. While generating capacity remained below demand throughout the 1990s, not all of Iraq suffered equally from power shortages. The government regularly channeled electricity to Baghdad at the expense of the much poorer southern part of the country, which had rebelled against the regime after the Gulf War. 
Government finance, debt and inflation
When the Iran-Iraq war and the UN embargo disrupted oil sales, the government was denied its main source of income. Funds raised through internal taxation typically totaled less than 3 percent of GDP; income from state activities, such as wages earned in state-owned enterprises, was exempt from taxation. Small firms paid taxes only if they did business with the government, and all firms commonly reduced their tax bills by underreporting their incomes and employment levels. The government collected some revenues from sales taxes, but these revenues were also a small source of funds.
Iraq used international capital markets to cushion the immediate revenue effects of the Iran-Iraq war. Development programs drawn up during the late 1970s were continued until 1982, financed by borrowed funds. Imports rose by more than 400 percent from 1978 to 1982, mostly because of an increase in non-military goods (Alnasrawi, 1994) . By 1990, however, debt service payments were soaking up 55 percent of Iraq's oil revenues (Alnasrawi, 1994) . Today, Iraq's debt is estimated to be about $120 billion, nearly six times GDP (Alnasrawi, 2002; Taylor 2004) .
Effects from the second interruption to Iraq's oil revenues, the UN embargo, could not be papered over with debt. The government then began to finance its operations by printing money. Until then, Iraq had not been a high inflation country.
Between 1945 (the first year for which data are available) and 1989, inflation usually stayed in the single digits. But rapid rates of monetary growth after the Gulf War caused inflation to rise from 6 percent in 1989 to nearly 500 percent in 1994. The Iraqi dinar depreciated from around 4 dinars per dollar in 1990 to more than 1,700 in 1995.
The rate of inflation exceeded the rate of money growth during this period, as Iraqis fled the dinar as a store of wealth and held gold or foreign currency instead.
Because interest rates paid on deposits were capped in the single digits, holding dinars in a bank account was also a losing proposition. One top Coalition budget official surmised that most Iraqis had never seen the inside of a bank when the 2003 war started.
More than 85 percent of M1 was held as currency throughout the late 1990s. But the Oil-for-Food program reduced incentives for private economic activity.
Microeconomics and markets
By augmenting the existing rationing system with imported food, the program discouraged the local production and distribution of food and other consumer items.
Some agricultural sectors, such as the poultry industry, were helped because they could import feed. But small grain farmers experienced extraordinary declines in incomes, because they could not compete with subsidized grain from abroad. Moreover, because the program allotted virtually the same basket to every family, most households sold part of their rations in secondary markets for cash, because they needed different things or because they preferred better quality items. The prices that consumers received in secondary markets were generally less than half the purchase cost of these goods, further depressing prices for local producers. Finally, by distributing food through the government's original food-rationing program, the program maintained the link between each family and their existing food distribution agent, typically a food store or bakery. This discouraged the entry of new retail firms.
Corruption
The Oil-for-Food program also exacerbated government corruption. After 1999, the UN removed the previous ceiling on permissible oil sales and relaxed the oversight of certain humanitarian imports. Iraq's leaders used the new flexibility to pocket illegal surcharges for oil sales (on the order of 10 percent) and demand kickbacks when purchasing imported goods. Illicit funds earned through the program help explain why Saddam Hussein was able to embark on an ambitious program of palace-building even as many in Iraq struggled to survive. These building programs were no doubt at least partially financed by illicit earnings, but government revenue might also have been used. One government official told us that budget authority for an "irrigation" improvement, for example, might have been used to build a private lake behind one of Saddam Hussein's homes. 3 In talking with members of Iraq's business community, we were told of another of Saddam Hussein's favored techniques of self-enrichment. He would purportedly encourage the formation of businesses that he believed would become profitable and then nurture their growth through various channels of favored treatment. After a while, Saddam would suddenly close the firm and confiscate its bank accounts and assets, while the owner would "disappear." We were told this was "Saddam's fattening of the lamb before its slaughter."
Corruption extended far below Saddam Hussein's inner circle. Starting a new business required an application to the Ministry of Trade that might take a year to complete. Worse, applications also attracted the attention of other parts of the government, like investigations by the secret police. Applicants were typically investigated to determine whether they had any relatives who belonged to opposition groups, who had deserted or avoided service in the army, or who had belonged to the regional militia in the restive Kurdish part of the country. "Even the involvement of relatives would cause the government to not let the applicant start any kind of business, and may lead to very serious charges," one official said. "That is why not many people would dare start any business" (Kader Hussein, 2003) . One Iraqi auto parts dealer, like other business people, simply avoided registration of his business to escape the attention of the government or organized crime. "If you go to the Trade Office, everyone will know," the dealer said. "So one way to keep a low profile is not to register your company. One year after opening my shop, a government inspector came, and I just had to pay him a bribe" (as quoted in Braude, 2003, p. 118) .
II. Iraq's Economy After the War
After the end of hostilities, the greatest effect of the 2003 war on Iraq's economy was the subsequent decline in oil and electricity production. Oil production had been running at 2.5 million bpd before the war. It dropped to near zero in April; exports Both of Iraq's statistical organizations, the CSO and the Central Bank, were heavily looted after the war, and both were slow to recommence operations. As a result, no data measure the effect of the war on private economic activity. It was undoubtedly
negative. An August 2003 survey of 393 small firms in Iraq sponsored by the IraqiAmerican Chamber of Commerce revealed that the average size of firms in the survey dropped from slightly more than 16 workers before the war (median size of seven workers) to an average of slightly more than 12 workers (median size of five workers) (Ommar and Khesbak, 2003) . Public employment also fell after the war, largely as a result of the Coalition's controversial decision in late May to disband the army. When the war ended, the army consisted of about 500,000 people, or about 7 percent of the current labor force. The Coalition would later pay stipends to former soldiers, but the decision to put them back on the streets without jobs has been blamed for worsening attacks on Coalition forces. In defending this decision, Coalition officials pointed out that much of the army had essentially melted away during the war. They also noted that the army has been a destabilizing political force throughout Iraq's history, dating back to the army's overthrow of the British-installed monarchy in 1958. Another group of public employees who lost their jobs were the 15,000-30,000 persons who had belonged to the top four levels of the Baath party. Outside of these changes, government employment levels were generally maintained. In particular, the 500,000 employees at state-owned enterprises continued to be paid after the war, even if electricity shortages, looting, or a lack of demand gave them little to do.
Economic effects of violence
Street crime has been a serious problem since the war ended. In the late summer For us, the lesson came early. A day before we published our first issue on 7 th July 2003, I woke up with a gun barrel in my face. Seven men were standing over me, holding Kalashnikovs and demanding money. They had nothing against the newspaper; they just saw us as westerners with cash. They tied me up and took our $12,000 stash of money (Fattah, 2004a ). information technology, and trade. "Basically," he said, "we have witnessed tremendous growth in our size, staff, and business volume." One way in which Hindo's firm has handled security problems is to break large jobs up into pieces and then try to finish each functional piece of the project in "hours and days rather than weeks or months," he said. "We believe that by reducing the lifetime of a project, you reduce the number of uncertainties that can affect you. Next week there might be protest, an electrical grid shutdown, or your laborers in Sadr City can't get out because there are Coalition roadblocks." Security problems have raised the firm's costs, but markets are clearing.
"People who are bold and aggressive are rewarded," Hindo said. "A laborer would cost you $7 a day, but if you take him to the Green Zone or hire him during turbulent times, the price goes up by two to three times. With that kind of financial reward, there is always a supply" (Hindo, 2004) .
Regional levels of violence are closely correlated with how residents assess Iraq's current economic situation. Whatever the quantitative state of Iraq's labor market, there is widespread agreement that Iraq needs jobs. The February poll also found that 96 percent of Iraqis believed that more employment opportunities would be effective in reducing violence (Oxford Research International, 2004) . Today, there is a "chicken-and-egg" relationship between jobs and security. Reductions in crime and violence would undoubtedly improve the employment climate, but these improvements are difficult with a poor job market. One frustrated job seeker from Sadr City (a poor, predominately Sh'ia area of Baghdad) put it this way: "I haven't been working at all for the last two weeks. If I stay like this for another week my family will starve, and if someone comes along with $50 and asks me to toss a grenade at the Americans, I'll do it with pleasure" (Banerjee and Cushman, 2003) .
III. Coalition Economic Policy
Although the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) enjoyed sweeping powers to make economic policy, policymakers were not free to pull out their textbooks and recast Iraq's economy as they saw fit. They faced three constraints in reforming Iraq's economy: one legal, one political, and one logistical. 
Influences on economic policy
The biggest influence on Coalition economic policy was the experience of the transition economies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia during the 1990s. Iraq, of course, is not Poland. For one thing, direct employment by the government in state-owned enterprises was much smaller in Iraq than in most of the formerly socialist countries. Even more important, most of Iraq's GDP comes from oil.
Perhaps the central economic question in Iraq is how oil revenues will be distributedthrough payments directly to individuals, for example, or by the government through its spending decisions.
Unfortunately, Iraq needs every oil dollar it can get to rebuild its infrastructure.
According to World Bank and CPA assessments, Iraq infrastructure investment requirements totaled $55 billion immediately after the war. This amount is far in excess of the $12 to $15 billion Iraq will receive in yearly oil revenues in the near future. As a result, Iraq not only had to ask the international community for help in rebuilding (which it did in an October donors' conference held in Madrid) but must also allocate oil revenues to either running the government or rebuilding the country, not for redistribution from an oil revenue trust fund.
With explicit redistribution schemes on the back burner, economic policy in 2003 focused on installing pro-market reforms that would be maintained by future Iraqi governments. Additionally, Coalition policymakers worked to impose discipline on state-owned enterprises and devise short-term stabilization measures that would be consistent with long-term growth. The two goals of pro-market reform and economic stabilization were central to the first major issue that Coalition economists confronted:
What should be done with the Iraqi dinar?
Currency reform
Early in the reconstruction, economists worried that the dinar would collapse.
Because each dinar featured the image of a smiling Saddam Hussein, fears that the dinar would become worthless once the Coalition took over caused it to weaken to more than 4,000 to the dollar in the spring of 2003. Coalition officials, of course, had no desire to erase the country's dinar-denominated assets. To send a signal that both the dollar and the dinar would be valued in the new Iraq, officials made an explicit decision to pay the April salaries of Iraqi government workers in dinars. These payments were complemented with "emergency payments" made in U.S. dollars. The signal of support for the dinar and the supply of new dollars arriving in the country caused the dinar to strengthen to below 1,500 to the dollar by the end of May. Yet even as a collapse in the dinar was avoided, Iraq's currency situation was disintegrating nonetheless.
Only two denominations of the "Saddam" dinar circulated widely by the end of the war: the 250-dinar note (worth about 17 cents) and a 10,000-dinar note that had been introduced in late 2002 (worth about $6.50). Immediately after the war, presses, plates, and paper for printing the 10,000-dinar note were stolen from the Central Bank's Dar AlNahrain printing works in Baghdad, leading to fears that the 10,000-dinar note would be widely counterfeited. Additionally, the relatively high value of the 10,000-dinar note made it difficult to use in everyday transactions. For both of these reasons, the larger note traded at a 10 to 30 percent discount relative to the smaller one when the reconstruction began. The discount made the 10,000 unattractive for salary payments and forced Iraqis to carry large wads of 250s when they went shopping. In June, the Coalition decided to print up new 250s to try to meet the demand (complete with Saddam Hussein's picture), but that did little to narrow the discount on the larger bill. indicated that a 250:1 rate was far out of line with purchasing power parity. The PPP rate appeared much closer to the 100:1 exchange rate that had prevailed from 1998 to 2002. After extensive discussions that included Iraqi leaders in both parts of the country, the Coalition Provisional Authority decided to set the conversion rate at one Swiss dinar 6 The origin of the "Swiss Dinar" term is murky. (Even the acting Minister of Finance did not know where the name came from.) One possibility is that the name derives from the fact that the plates for this currency were made in Switzerland (though most bills were actually printed in England). Another rumored possibility is that because Iraq did not have a history of inflation before the Gulf War, people thought the Iraqi dinar was "as solid as a Swiss franc." (the earliest date for which official daily data are available), the exchange rate for the 250 stood at about 2,000 to the dollar, while the rate for the 10,000 stood at more than 2,500.
The 250/10,000 gap fluctuated between 15 and 35 percent following the July 7 announcement of the impending banknote exchange. The gap finally closed in the first week of September, a few weeks before the start of the currency exchange, when both denominations traded near 2,100 to the dollar. The dinar has since strengthened to about 1,450 to the dollar.
On October 15, 2003, the currency exchange for new dinars began. The massive movements of currency around the country went off well, although two currency convoys were unsuccessfully attacked in an intense firefight near Samarra in late November. By the time the currency exchange ended three months later, a pound of old currency had been turned in for every man, woman, and child in the country.
Reopening banks and encouraging lending
Although some private banks exist, Iraq's banking system is dominated by the two state-owned banks, Rafidain and Rasheed. Taken together, in 2003 these two banks held about 90 percent of total banking sector assets (about $2 billion) and operated 340 branches around the country. Each of these branches was a tempting target to postwar looters. Some bank managers displayed great bravery in the days following the war, saving the assets and records of their banks from being stolen or destroyed. Most vaults were not breached by looters, though doors were damaged and building interiors were trashed. 7 Reopening bank branches presented financial and logistical challenges, such as organizing a military escort for currency movements to a re-opened bank. Despite these challenges, most bank branches had been reopened by the end of the summer.
The CPA took two major steps in 2003 intended to strengthen Iraq's banking industry over the long run. In November, the Trade Bank of Iraq was begun to facilitate large international transactions. In late September, the CPA and the Governing Council issued a 66-page commercial bank law that followed international best practices, covering virtually all aspects of banking operations. The order requires that the country's private banks have paid-in capital of at least 10 billion dinars (around $5 million at that point), though the country's 17 existing private banks were given 18 months to reach that amount. The bank law also allows six foreign banks to have majority owned subsidiaries or to establish branches in Iraq during the next five years, and allows an unlimited number of foreign banks to buy up to 50 percent of an existing Iraqi bank. Other financial reforms include establishment of the "micro-lending" credit facilities around the country and the liberalization of interest rates, which took place on Perhaps unbeknownst to them, the vaults had held a priceless collection of ancient jewelry, the Treasures of Nimrud. Fortunately, the doors held, though the Central Bank building itself was gutted and burned in the immediate postwar chaos.
International openness
After more than a decade of international sanctions and limited trade, Iraqis were starved for imports. Soon after entering Baghdad, American officials announced that Iraq's borders were open, and on June 8, 2003, the CPA formalized a "tariff holiday" that eliminated virtually all barriers to trade until December 31, 2003. Imports poured into Iraq's stores, street markets, and roadside stands. Demand was especially strong for goods that had been prohibited by the previous regime, such as satellite dishes.
The tariff holiday was never intended to be permanent. On September 19, 2003, the CPA issued an Order calling for a uniform 5 percent "reconstruction surcharge" to be levied on imports into the country, excluding food, medicine, clothing, and books.
Some advisers would have preferred a zero surcharge, while other advisers argued that the distortionary effects of a small, uniform tariff were justified given the desire for government revenues. After some rescheduling (to allow a collection system to be set up), the levy was ultimately scheduled to go into effect on 
Fiscal and monetary policy
Iraq's oil wealth means that it does not have to levy domestic taxes. Arguments for the exclusive use of oil revenues to fund the government include the distortions that arise from any proportional tax and the costs of administering a tax system. In Iraq's case, the stimulus to business of a no-tax regime might be especially valuable, because Iraq's exports of natural resources may put upward pressure on its real exchange rate and thereby limit non-energy exports (the so-called "Dutch disease"). Yet a tax system would allow Iraqis to experience directly the opportunity cost of government spending.
It would also send a message to international donors that Iraqis are bearing part of the cost of their own reconstruction.
In September, the Coalition announced that all taxes for 2003 were suspended, but that taxes would be imposed for future years. In the long run, the credibility and independence of the CBI will be vital no matter what its specific monetary instruments. In March 2004, the CPA and Governing Council adopted a Central Bank law that incorporates global best practices. Central to the law is the statement that " [t] he primary objectives of the CBI shall be to achieve and maintain domestic price stability and to foster and maintain a stable and competitive market-based financial system. Subject to these objectives, the CBI shall also promote sustainable growth, employment, and prosperity in Iraq.ʺ
Legal reform
Over time, Iraq's commercial laws were corrupted by the inclusion of socialist 
IV. Reforms Left for Future Iraqi Governments
As of early April 2004, most economic reforms that had been enacted did not entail much short-term sacrifice on the part of Iraqis. Iraqis were generally glad to get a new currency. They were not immediately affected by new banking or commercial laws, nor had the infrastructure for tax collection yet been put in place. But achieving maximal rates of per-capita income growth in the long run will require some short-term sacrifices.
This section discusses two reforms that were left undone by the Coalition for fear of worsening unrest in the country. It concludes with a third that was omitted for fear that there was no margin for error in case it went wrong.
State-owned enterprises
Reform of Iraq's state-owned enterprises still has far to go. In 2003, the Coalition prevented the SOEs from accessing their bank accounts and limited any SOE subsidies to formal budget items, in contrast with the past convention of providing implicit subsidies via below-market exchange rates or other surreptitious accounting conventions. The Coalition also erased all inter-SOE debts as of the end of the war. This was done in order to get the SOEs to focus on becoming productive in the future and to avoid wasting resources on collecting debts incurred by other SOEs in the past. The Coalition has begun taking applications from investors interesting in leasing some large SOEs, a possible first step to privatizing them under a future Iraqi government. SOEs have also entered into joint ventures with foreign firms, including a deal that a construction SOE signed with a Saudi firm. Yet many SOEs will have to be closed, including the sugar refinery in Sulamaniyah that was destroyed in the Iran-Iraq war but which never laid off its workforce. An optimal way to close SOEs would be to give each unemployed worker a large severance payment. Such a payment would not only cushion the blow of losing a job, but would also give the worker some seed money to start his own business should he so desire.
Raising energy prices
Energy prices in Iraq are far too low. Because of government subsidies, the price of premium grade gasoline is 50 dinars (or 3.2 cents) per liter, compared with more than $1 per liter in Turkey, $0.42 in Jordan and $0.50 in Syria. Much of the benefit from Iraq's oil subsidies flows to illegal exporters and black-market resellers, who profit from the discrepancy in prices. Other forms of energy, such as electricity and liquid propane gas, are also heavily subsidized. The total opportunity cost of the provision of oil products at government-established prices is about $4.9 billion per year -equivalent to more than a third of the 2004 budget. 9 Liberalizing energy prices is bound to be controversial. But the experiences of other countries shows that political unrest is minimized by announcing the program far ahead of time and by ensuring that market demand is met by true liberalization (so that the program is not seen merely as justification for an arbitrary price hike). Unrest is also reduced when it is clear to households that the policy will not be rescinded and when prices are increased in a time of economic upswing, rather than in a downturn.
Replacing food rations with a cash payment or "oil dividend"
One potential reform would improve Iraq's microeconomic climate while establishing a precedent for the distribution of oil revenues at the same time. The government's food ration system, now funded by oil sales, could be turned into a monthly allocation of cash. The funds would then provide a source of demand for Iraq's private sector, expand the consumption set of Iraqis, and establish the crucial precedent that Iraq's oil wealth belongs to its people and not to the government. To ensure stability, the program could be phased in geographically, neighborhood by neighborhood, after a series of trials.
While most economists were excited about the possibility of monetization, many Iraqis felt that the country had enough on its plate in 2003 and 2004. Undertaking such a massive reform might be destabilizing if people worried that the private sector could not 9 Exacerbating the costs of the oil product subsidies are their distortionary effects. The U.S. government appropriated $690 million to assist Iraqis in buying kerosene and other refined oil products, but Iraqi "demand" for these products at the subsidized prices still could not be satisfied. Moreover, investment funds are being misallocated as Iraqi households purchase diesel generators and air conditioners that will become uneconomical when fuel prices rise to reflect true costs. Finally, the bulk of the subsidies go to the rich, who own more cars, have larger homes, and consume more electricity than the poor. respond quickly enough to meet the country's food needs. Yet given the benefits of monetization, it is likely that future governments will consider it seriously.
V. Conclusion: Iraq's Economic Prospects
The year 2004 should see a sharp economic expansion in Iraq. In addition to private-sector growth, employment driven by public spending is rising, with the Coalition having created about 380,000 jobs directly as of early March. About 220,000 of these jobs were in security or national defense, with another 68,000 persons working as civilian contractors on Coalition projects and the remainder in regional jobs programs or In the long run, economic growth in Iraq will depend on fostering private-sector growth outside the oil sector. This, in turn, will hinge on whether the future political system maintains the pro-market outlook of Coalition policy. Whether Iraqis are willing to look to the private sector for jobs and prosperity -rather than to the government that Countering the inertial obstacles to market reform in Iraq will be the large group of Iraqis who have embraced market opportunities in the past 18 months -importing goods for sale, opening new firms, seeking out customers for their banks and foreign partners for joint ventures. Iraqi exiles are also returning to the country, no doubt driven by the desire to help their country rebuild while making money at the same time. Given these opposing forces, it is impossible to predict the future direction of Iraqi economic policy. The only certainty was voiced by Ambassador Bremer in his speech in Amman more than a year ago: "Just as forming a vibrant political climate in Iraq will entail many challenges, so too creating a vibrant economy in Iraq will not be easy." 
